The Defence Headquarters (DHQ) has confirmed a recent attack by Boko Haram and Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists on troops engaged in stabilization operations at a defense site located in Gubio Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State.
In a statement issued by the Director of Defence Media Operations, Major General Edward Buba, it was reported that five soldiers were killed during the coordinated assault. Additionally, ten soldiers sustained injuries, and four are currently unaccounted for. The troops successfully neutralized several terrorists and recovered a cache of weapons during the encounter.
"The coordinated attack resulted in the loss of five soldiers, with ten wounded and four reported missing in action. However, our forces were able to eliminate multiple terrorists and seize various weapons," stated Major General Buba.
The communiqué further indicated that the enemy forces inflicted damage on military equipment, leading to the destruction of one gun truck, three armored vehicles, and an excavator.
In response to the situation, the DHQ announced the deployment of a reinforcement team, which includes air support, to thoroughly investigate the area and pursue the terrorists' retreat.
"Notably, it is crucial to emphasize that such attacks will not deter the troops and the armed forces of Nigeria from their commitment to eradicate terrorism, insurgency, and the broader security challenges confronting the nation," the DHQ affirmed.
Furthermore, Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno State expressed condolences to the military regarding the loss of life among the soldiers. Through a statement from the State Commissioner for Information and Internal Security, Usman Tar, the governor remarked that the attack underscores the relentless brutality of Boko Haram terrorists.
"On behalf of the government and the citizens of Borno, I extend our deepest condolences to the armed forces and the families of the deceased. May Allah grant peace to their souls and strength to the grieving families," the governor stated.
ISWAP Originality and Their Terror Tactics
The Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), officially designated as Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā (Arabic: ولاية غرب إفريقية), translates to "West African Province."
ISWAP operates as a militant group and an administrative division of the Islamic State (IS), which is recognized as a Salafi jihadist militant organization and an unrecognized quasi-state.
This group is predominantly active in the Chad Basin and engages in an extensive insurgency against the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Turkey.
ISWAP is a splinter faction of Boko Haram, with which it maintains a violent rivalry; notable events include the suicide of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau during a confrontation with ISWAP in 2021.
Before March 2022, ISWAP served as an umbrella organization for various IS factions in West Africa, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), despite limited direct affiliations between ISWAP and IS-GS.
The origins of ISWAP can be traced back to the emergence of Boko Haram, a Salafi jihadist movement primarily based in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria.
This movement initiated an insurgency against the Nigerian government following a failed uprising in 2009, with the intent of establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria and its neighboring regions, including parts of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
Abubakar Shekau, the de facto leader of the movement, sought to elevate his status among international Islamist groups by aligning Boko Haram with the prominent Islamic State (IS) in March 2015, subsequently adopting the name "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP).
Following the defeat of the insurgents and the loss of nearly all their territory during the 2015 West African offensive conducted by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), dissent grew among the insurgents.
Despite directives from ISIL's central command to prohibit the use of women and children as suicide bombers and to refrain from extensive civilian casualties, Shekau resisted altering his strategies.
Researcher Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi characterized Shekau as "too extreme even by the Islamic State's standards." Shekau's persistent refusal to fully comply with ISIL's central authority ultimately resulted in his removal as ISWAP leader in August 2016.
In response to his ousting, Shekau severed ties with ISIL's central command; however, a considerable number of insurgents opted to remain loyal to IS.
Consequently, the rebel faction divided into a Shekau-aligned group, known as "Jama'at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad" or "Boko Haram," and a pro-IS faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, which continued identifying itself as "Islamic State's West Africa Province."
These two factions have since engaged in conflict with one another, although they have occasionally collaborated against local governments. Additionally, Shekau never formally renounced his allegiance to IS in its entirety; therefore, his faction is sometimes regarded as a "second branch of ISWAP." Overall, the relationship between Shekau and IS remains complex and ambiguous.
In the following years, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) led by Barnawi and Boko Haram under Shekau both reestablished their influence, with ISWAP emerging as the more dominant entity.
By 2019, Shekau commanded approximately 1,000 to 2,000 fighters, while ISWAP's ranks had expanded to an estimated 5,000 personnel. ISWAP modified its operational tactics, seeking to cultivate support among local populations, in stark contrast to Boko Haram's notorious reputation for indiscriminate violence.
The group began to establish rudimentary governance systems and concentrated its attacks on Christian targets, rather than Muslim ones. Nonetheless, ISWAP continued to engage in hostilities against humanitarian workers and selectively targeted Muslim communities.
During the Chad Basin campaign from 2018 to 2020, ISWAP achieved significant territorial gains but later relinquished many of these areas following counter-offensives from local security forces.
This period was marked by severe internal discord, culminating in the ousting of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the execution of several key commanders. In 2020, the Nigerian Armed Forces undertook multiple attempts to seize control of the Timbuktu Triangle from ISWAP but encountered substantial losses with no significant territorial advances.
In April 2021, ISWAP successfully captured a Nigerian Army base near Mainok, seizing armored fighting vehicles, including main battle tanks and other military equipment. The subsequent month saw ISWAP overpower Boko Haram's strongholds in the Sambisa Forest, leading to the reported suicide of Abubakar Shekau.
This turn of events prompted a wave of defections from Boko Haram to ISWAP, resulting in a network of strongholds extending from Nigeria to Mali and into southern Libya. Despite these victorious developments, ISWAP faced ongoing challenges from Boko Haram loyalists who resisted the Islamic State's influence.
In August 2021, reports of Abu Musab al-Barnawi's death emerged, although the circumstances remain contested by various sources suggesting he may have been promoted rather than killed.
During this same period, ISWAP experienced operational setbacks, including a failed offensive in Diffa, while successfully raiding Rann to demolish the local barracks and depart with valuables. Leadership changes within ISWAP were notable in October and November, as several senior commanders fell to security operations, leading to Sani Shuwaram ascending as the new primary leader.
By January 2022, ISWAP intensified its activities within Nigeria's Borno State, overtaking villages and establishing markets. Notably, the insurgents captured the small town of Gudumbali on 24 January 2022, declaring it the new provincial capital after expelling local chieftains.
Gudumbali held both strategic and symbolic significance as a former major stronghold of Boko Haram. However, a prompt counter-offensive by Nigerian forces resulted in the recapture of the settlement, the destruction of ISWAP’s local headquarters, and the dismantling of an associated night market.
Researchers Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh posited by this juncture that ISWAP had evolved into one of the Islamic State's most crucial strongholds. In March 2022, IS central command officially recognized the Greater Sahara branch as an autonomous province, referred to as the "Sahel Province." ISWAP continued to exert influence over Islamic State activities in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger despite the ongoing assaults on its leadership, which resulted in the elimination of several high-ranking commanders.
In June 2022, the Nigerian National Security Council indicated that ISWAP was likely responsible for the attack on a church in Owo. By October 2022, ISWAP had absorbed a majority of former Boko Haram factions, including the integration of Shekau’s biological son, Abul Musanna, as a commander. Nevertheless, certain Boko Haram factions persisted in their opposition, finding support among defectors who rejoined their original groups. These splinter factions typically avoided confrontations with ISWAP, compelling the group to allocate considerable resources to prevent further defections and locate Boko Haram loyalists.
Despite these difficulties, ISWAP expanded its operational footprint into central, northwestern, and southwestern Nigeria. In the western region, it commenced competition with a resurgent Ansaru, while orchestrating attacks against government forces, executing terrorist actions, and conducting targeted assassinations.
In December of the same year, ISWAP pledged allegiance to the newly appointed caliph of the Islamic State, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi. Concurrently, hostilities between ISWAP and Boko Haram escalated into the Battles of Toumbun Allura Kurnawa and Toumbun Gini. By January 2023, these conflicts culminated in a significant victory for Boko Haram, resulting in the loss of several ISWAP bases around Lake Chad, with heavy fighting persisting in subsequent months.
From March to June 2023, ISWAP substantially increased the frequency of small-scale raids in Cameroon's Far North Region, targeting various locations including Gassama, Amchide, Fotokol, and Mora. Researcher Jacob Zenn suggested that these operations primarily served as initiatives to gather supplies and bolster their capabilities.